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The Case Against Maritime
Class Arbitration:
A Brief Policy Argument
Landon R. Schwob*
"The shipping and commodity trades of the world are unusual in that they
do not regard. . . arbitration with abhorrence. On the contrary, they regard
it as a normal incident of commercial life-a civilised way of resolving the
many differences of opinion which are bound to arise.
~Lord Donaldson of Lymington'
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 27, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided a case that
will have far-reaching implications for virtually all sectors within the
arbitration industry, including the subject of this article-maritime
arbitration.2  The question presented in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp. dealt with class arbitration and whether its imposition on
parties whose arbitration clauses are silent on that issue is consistent with the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).3
The Court's primary focus and concern in deciding Stolt-Nielsen was
with the broader issues of class arbitration, as well as more complicated
interpretations of contract law and the FAA.4 Although the parties to the
case were privy to a maritime contract, this fact was more or less incidental
to the Court's discussion and focus.' Indeed, some claim that even though
* Landon Schwob is a Juris Doctorate candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law. He
received his Bachelor of Science degree in Finance from the Robert H. Smith School of Business at
the University of Maryland in 2008. He would like to thank Mr. Bruce Harris, prominent London
maritime arbitrator and former President of the London Maritime Arbitrators Association, for his
insightful feedback and commentary during the writing of this article.
I. Pando Compania Navicra S.A. v. Filmo, S.A.S., [1975] I Lloyd's Rep. 560 (Q.B.).
2. Stolt-Niclsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
3. Id. at 1766.
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the parties to the case were sophisticated maritime entities, "what [was]
really at stake [was] the continued viability of class arbitration in consumer
disputes."
In contrast to the more generalized approach taken by the Court in
deciding Stolt-Nielsen, this article will primarily examine the history and
viability of class arbitration-and arbitration in general-in the far more
narrow context of maritime and the admiralty. Stolt-Nielsen provides an
excellent backdrop against which to explore the more maritime-specific
aspects of the topic, an endeavor not often undertaken by the Court or legal
scholars.7
Part II will briefly expound on the facts before the Court in Stolt-
Nielsen. Part III will explore the rich and fabled history of maritime law and
dispute resolution, and the benefits derived from submitting maritime
disputes to arbitration rather than litigation. Part IV will focus briefly on the
history of class arbitration and recent trends in the field. Part V will attempt
to synthesize the various arguments made by the parties as to whether class
arbitration should apply in maritime disputes regardless of contractual
silence or express inclusion. Part VI will conclude the article by expounding
on the Court's decision and what Stolt-Nielsen could mean for the maritime
industry as well as for arbitration in general.
II. BRIEF FACTS
Stolt-Nielsen arose from disputes subject to international maritime
arbitration agreements among multinational corporations involved in oceanic
shipping.! Stolt-Nielsen, a foreign corporation operating parcel tankers
carrying bulk chemical and other specialty liquids in individual tanks,9
entered into bilateral shipping contracts with AnimalFeeds, a multinational
6. Stolt-Nielsen Oral Argument Analysis: Part I, http://loreclawfirm.com/blog/stolt-nicisen-
oral-argument-analysis-part-i (Dec. 13, 2009, 08:39 EST). See also Posting of Anna Christensen to
SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/12/does-the-faa-permit-class-arbitration-when-the-
arbitration-agreement-is-silent (Dec. 8, 2009, 15:52 EST) ("Given the ubiquitous use of arbitration
agreements across a wide range of industries, the outcome of this case could have far-reaching
effects.").
7. See William W. Park, Private Disputes and the Public Good Explaining Arbitration Law,
20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 903, 906 (2005) ("[M]aritime arbitration ... [is] . . . a richly variegated
field that has been too often neglected in colloquia addressing international arbitration."). See also
Fabrizio Marrella, Unity and Diversity in International Arbitration: The Case of Maritime
Arbitration, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2005) ("[D]espite the multi-secular existence of
such an institution and its wide distribution in merchant trading, there has been limited scholarly
review and investigation of maritime arbitration.").
8. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764-65.
9. Id. at 1764.
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corporation.'o The terms of these contracts, known in the maritime
community as "charter parties," called for disputes to be committed to
arbitration but were silent as to the applicability of class arbitration."
Subsequently, AnimalFeeds accused Stolt-Nielsen of price-fixing and
filed an antitrust suit.'2  The District Court held the claims were not
arbitrable under the charter party, but the Second Circuit reversed and
compelled arbitration.13  In arbitration, AnimalFeeds filed a putative class
action against Stolt-Nielsen, seeking to arbitrate the anti-trust claims "of all
direct purchasers of parcel tanker transportation services globally for bulk
liquid chemicals, edible oils, acids, and other specialty liquids" from Stolt-
Nielsen.14  Because the arbitration agreement was silent as to class
arbitration, the arbitrators stayed the proceeding to allow the parties to seek
judicial review.' 5
III. MARITIME ARBITRATION
A. A Brief History
Maritime commerce and trade is ancient, with some of the earliest
records of maritime commerce dating back to 1500 B.C.'6  Maritime law
also has a long and rich history,'7 which some characterize as being "as long
as mankind"' 8 itself. And for hundreds of years, the maritime industry has
10. Id
11. Id at 1764, 1766.
12. Id at 1765.
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id at 1766.
16. An example of such an ancient, rich, and vibrant history was depicted on "an Egyptian
relic in the British Museum .. . and depicts a three-masted vessel owned by Queen Hapsheput, who
just happens to have been the princess who rescued Moses from the bulrushes." See DAVID W.
ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2008) (citing JAMES
WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 875-76 (1928)).
17. See id. ("[Tihere is evidence for the existence of substantive maritime law at ... circa 300
B.C.").
18. See James Allsop, International Maritime Arbitration: Legal and Policy Issues (Paper
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also used "alternate dispute resolution in one form or another, most notably
arbitration."'
Maritime arbitration most commonly arises from disputes involving
contracts for the carriage of goods, insurance, or shipping20-- disputes much
like the one that arose between the parties in Stolt-Nielsen.21 According to
the International Chamber of Shipping, "[a]round 90% of world trade is
carried by the international shipping industry."22 Moreover, there are nearly
50,000 merchant ships, registered in over 150 nations, "trading
internationally, transporting every kind of cargo."23 Historically, maritime
commerce has "not [been] restricted to one country ....
It follows naturally, therefore, that disputes which arise from maritime
activities almost always involve international contracts made between
19. Charles L. Measter & Peter Skoufalos, The Increasing Role of Mediation in Resolving
Shipping Disputes, 26 TUL. MAR. L.J. 515, 517 (2002). See also Expert Declaration of Bruce Harris
at T 2 [hereinafter Harris Expert] (on file with author) (Harris, the proposed arbitrator in Stolt-
Nielsen, explains: "International maritime arbitration has been established for a very long time ...
."); 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
57:147 (4th ed. 2001) ("Among long established and time honored uses of arbitration in the various
spheres of activity in trade and commerce, few can compare with charter parties."); Marrella, supra
note 7, at 1057 ("[Mlaritime arbitration has ancient origins, and . . . maritime arbitration preceded
international commercial arbitration, with its roots dating back to the times of the ancient lex
mercatoria."); Buffy D. Lord, Dispute Resolution on the High Seas: Aspects ofMaritime Arbitration,
8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 71 (2002) ("In the maritime industry, arbitration has served as a common
tool for the settlement of disputes for several decades."); Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc.,
Maritime Arbitration in New York, http://www.smany.org/sma/ about2.html ("[T]he origins of
maritime arbitration can be traced as far back as the voyages of ships owned by ancient Phoenicians
carrying the cargoes of Greek traders.").
20. See Marrella, supra note 7, at 1059.
Typically, issues center around: the investigation of damage to transported goods and
ensuing liability attached to the maritime carrier; damages to the ship caused by the
nature of the carried goods; issues of lay days and demurrage including damages
resulting from late entry to port or late access to the operative quay; damages suffered by
the carrier as a result of force majeure; issues relating to non-execution of charter parties
(for example, non-payment of the charter fee, late return of the vessel or early collection
of the ship); sale, construction and ship repairs; matters relating to salvage at sea; and
maritime insurance.
Id
21. See Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010).
22. International Chamber of Shipping, Shipping Facts,
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/ index.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
23. Id.
24. Soo Sandra Jin Lee, Is Sky Reefer in Jeopardy? The MLA 's Proposed Changes To
Maritime Foreign Arbitration Clauses, 72 WASH. L. REv. 625, 625 (1997).
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parties who are often from different countries.25 When speaking about
dispute resolution, "maritime" is practically synonymous with
"international" and it is easy to understand why maritime arbitration is
widely characterized as a type of international commercial arbitration.26
B. Why Arbitration?
Some argue that this international nature of maritime commerce makes
the industry ideal for arbitration,27 making the general benefits of intra-
national arbitration even more important and significant to entities engaged
in maritime commerce. According to Bruce Harris, a prominent maritime
arbitrator based in London, there are numerous benefits to resolving
maritime disputes through arbitration rather than through litigation.28
First, arbitration has traditionally been limited to the resolution of a
dispute between only two parties, and maritime arbitration, accordingly, has
historically been a bilateral affair.29 Second, arbitration gives the parties to a
contract some certainty of a mutually acceptable, neutral forum. Because so
much business in the maritime industry is done on an international level,o
25. See Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978).
26. See Marrella, supra note 7, at 1059 ("[M]aritime arbitration is a species belonging to the
genus' of international commercial arbitration .... ).
27. See generally Brief of Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 9, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198),
2009 WL 1144191, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/ 06 /08 -
1198_certamicus maritime.pdf [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Br. of Society of Maritime Arbitrators]
("The international nature of shipping and the particular rules, standards and terminology that have
emerged in the business of transporting cargoes across the oceans lend themselves to commercial
arbitration where the contractual parties refer their disputes to be decided by a peer.").
28. See Harris Expert, supra note 19,17.
29. See generally S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration In the International Sphere: Due
Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 6, 84 (2008) (stating that
"[i]ntemational commercial arbitration developed primarily as a means of enforcing bilateral
contracts, and the vast majority of its policies and procedures reflect that tradition." Many
arguments for the benefits of multiparty arbitration "have not been universally adopted as a means of
overcoming the traditional view of arbitration as a bilateral, contractual construct."). See also Harris
Expert, supra note 19, 1 20.
30. See generally J. Michael Taylor, Evaluating the Continuing Gats Negotiations Concerning
International Maritime Transport Services, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 129, 150 (2002) (stating that
"[b]ecause of its importance to world trade, maritime transport has historically been the focus of
international attention . . . "). The author goes on to state that "maritime transport already is one of
the most internationally integrated service sectors in the world," and that "maritime transport is
undeniably global in its procedures and reach." Id. at 150-51.
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contracting entities seeking to resolve disputes through litigation may
otherwise be subjected to biased courts or differing laws."' In contrast to
this potential for bias in litigation, the relative neutrality of an impartial
third-party makes arbitration particularly well suited to the settlement of
disputes arising in maritime commerce.32
Third, the privacy and confidentiality of arbitration makes it a desirable
method of resolving international maritime disputes." Maritime commerce
usually involves sophisticated commercial entities, such as shipping
companies like Stolt-Nielsen, and common carriers-not consumers.34 Such
parties have a heightened interest in preventing the terms of their
commercial relationship from being disclosed to third parties.35
Fourth, parties in arbitration value the opportunity to select those who
will decide the dispute, something which is advantageous to all sectors of
arbitration. However, this is of particular significance in complex maritime
disputes where most charter provisions provide for discretion of the parties
to choose commercial persons with the unique and requisite maritime
experience and knowledge to serve as arbitrators.36 Realizing that this
31. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 19, § 57:147 ("The international nature of the
maritime business makes arbitration more practicable . . . than litigation, which is subject to the
vagaries of diverse courts, imposing differing legal standards dependent more on national history
than on the realities of seafaring commerce.").
32. See generally id. See also Amicus Curiae Br. of Association of Ship Brokers And Agents,
BIMCO, Bergen Shipowners Association, Chamber of Shipping of America, International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners, Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc., Norwegian Shipowners
Association, Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc., and the Teekay Corporation in Support of
Petitioner at 27, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198),
2009 WL 2896310, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/preview/publicedpreview-briefs3dfs-
07 08 08 1198 PetitionerAmCu9ShippingOrgs.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Br.
of Ship Brokers And Agents] ("[M]any maritime charters . . . provide for a neutral system of dispute
resolution that is not based on the unique laws or customs of any one nation.").
33. See Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in
International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 121, 121 (2003) ("[C]onfidentiality is an
important aspect of international commercial arbitration . . . ."). See also S.I. Strong, The Sounds of
Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards when Ordering Class
Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1086 (2009)
("[P]roponents of international arbitration have long touted its ability to keep proceedings private
and confidential.").
34. See generally Graydon S. Staring, The Admiralty Jurisdiction of Torts and Crimes and the
Failed Search For Its Purposes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 433, 463 (2007) (stating that "maritime
commerce is traffic in vessels"). See also Amicus Curiae Br. of Ship Brokers And Agents, supra
note 32, at 25 ("[M]aritime arbitration ... is normally between two companies, not an individual
consumer and a company.").
35. Harris Expert, supra note 19,18.
36. See Marrella, supra note 7, at 1085 ("[Iun the maritime world, out of respect for a
multisecular tradition, parties select arbitrators from among those who have a specific professional
426
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aspect of arbitration is of such great importance in the context of maritime
arbitration, the London Maritime Arbitration Association stated that
"arbitrators must be specialists on maritime matters and not specialists of
arbitration law ... "
Fifth, arbitration is often faster than litigation and can be conducted at a
much lower cost. Although this is advantageous in all forms of arbitration, it
is of particularly great importance in maritime commerce, where exigent
circumstances often require a quick resolution of a dispute." The rapid
speed of arbitration, as opposed to untimely and sluggish litigation, makes it
readily apparent why alternative dispute resolution is particularly attractive
to parties engaged in maritime commerce.
Recognition of these benefits among maritime entities has made
arbitration in the maritime industry increasingly desirable and popular over
the years39 and has led the overwhelming majority of maritime disputes to be
relegated to arbitration. 40  Indeed, most of the widely-used shipping
contracts in existence today provide for arbitration. It is the continued
reliance on these traditional and established benefits that has made
arbitration of maritime disputes so wildly popular, and some argue that these
background in the sector where they have accumulated significant practical experience, which is
rarely of a legal/judicial type."); WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 19, at 88 ("[M]aritime arbitrations
have facets not found in many other types of arbitrations due to their highly transient and
international nature."); International Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 ("The most
sought-after arbitrators are those who are prominent and experienced members of the specific
business community in which the dispute to be arbitrated arose.").
37. See Marrella, supra note 7, at 1086.
38. See id. at 1087 (stating that there is a "need for rapid resolution of controversies" in
maritime disputes). See also Lord, supra note 19, at 72 (stating that "maritime arbitration remains a
popular way to resolve maritime disputes that arise . .. because of the lower costs involved. . . ").
39. See Georgios I. Zekos, Maritime Arbitration and the Rule of Law, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM.
523, 524 (2008) ("[Mlaritime arbitration has become popular as an alternative to litigation, because
of the costs, delay and procedural complications of court proceedings."). Zekos went on to state that
"in recent years the private sector has begun to use binding arbitration as the favored method of
dispute resolution and the payback appears to be that arbitration is a 'quicker, less expensive and
more private alternative to litigation."' Id. at 541. See also Leon E. Trakman, "Legal Traditions"
and International Commercial Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 31 n.132 (2006) (highlighting
the "noticeable growth of specialized areas of arbitration" and proposing that "the most pronounced
of these growth areas in international commercial arbitration relate to maritime law").
40. See Measter & Skoufalos, supra note 19, at 520 ("[T]he majority of maritime disputes are
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benefits are "an important, accepted[,] and acknowledged part of the
maritime industry."4 2
C. The Globalization ofMaritime Arbitration
The trend away from litigation toward arbitration has generated an
enormous demand for the establishment of more regional maritime
arbitration organizations. In response to this demand, countries such as
China and Singapore, among many others, have established local maritime
arbitration organizations.4 3 Even though this trend has led major ports in
most countries to establish organizations that handle maritime arbitration in
some capacity," the two primary locales for international maritime
arbitration are, and most likely will continue to be, London and New York.45
According to the Society of Maritime Arbitrators of New York, the
preeminent maritime arbitration authority in New York, 46 New York has
42. See Amicus Curiae Br. of Ship Brokers And Agents, supra note 32, at 18. See also
Amicus Curiae Br. of Society of Maritime Arbitrators, supra note 27, at 9 (stating that "efficiency,
speed and finality in getting resolution to contract differences have always been valued by the
shipping community").
43. See Mark S. Hamilton, Sailing in a Sea of Obscurity: The Growing Importance of China's
Maritime Arbitration Commission, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 10 ("[B]ecause of China's growing
importance within the maritime shipping industry, it follows that CMAC [China's Maritime
Arbitration Commission] will assume an increasingly important role in resolving maritime
disputes."). See also Lawrence G. Cohen, Maritime Arbitration in Asia, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 117,
117 (1998) ("[M]aritime arbitration is establishing a stronger foothold in Asia."); Measter &
Skoufalos, supra note 19, at 519 ("[M]aritime arbitrations are also being conducted in Hong Kong,
Singapore, Beijing, Paris and other less likely venues.").
44. See Robert Force, Two Models of Maritime Dispute Resolution: Litigation and Arbitration,
65 TUL. L. REv. 1461, 1464 (1991) ("Although some arbitrations are held in other port cities, when
one speaks about maritime arbitration in the United States, the reference is to New York
arbitration."). See also International Congress of Maritime Arbitrators, Maritime Arbitration
Associations, http://www.icmaweb.com/index.php/national-maritime-arbitration-associations (last
visited Mar. 22, 2011) (listing numerous associations around the world that promote arbitration in
maritime disputes).
45. Force, supra note 44, at 1464 ("Virtually all of the maritime arbitration in the United
States occurs in New York."); Donald E. Zubrod, Arbitration from the Arbitrator's Point of View, 49
TuL. L. REV. 1054, 1055 ("The vast majority of maritime arbitrations throughout the world are
conducted in the United States and Great Britain, almost invariably in New York and London.");
Measter & Skoufalos, supra note 19, at 519 ("London and New York are the venues for the majority
of cases .... ); Cohen, supra note 43, at 117 ("Most maritime arbitrations are conducted in either
London or New York, and will likely continue to be held in these cities for the foreseeable future ...
46. See Bruce Harris, Maritime Arbitration in the U.S. and the U.K., Past, Present, and Future:
The View from London, Address at William Tetley Maritime Law Lecture 2008 (Mar. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritime-admiralty [hereinafter Harris Speech]
("[Tlhe only real American competitor to London has been the Big Apple and its excellent Society
of Maritime Arbitrators. . . ."). See also Amicus Curiae Br. of Ship Brokers And Agents, supra note
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been a center of international arbitration since the early twentieth century.47
As one of the primary hubs of international maritime arbitration in the
world, proponents of New York maritime arbitration argue that New York
arbitration is cheaper,48 more transparent,49 and more flexibleo than London
maritime arbitration.
London shares a similarly long history in this regard, with "maritime
arbitration in London bec[oming] popular because of the existence of the
Baltic Exchange . . . . Moreover, as one of the busiest financial and
business hubs in all of Europe, London's "linguistic and geographical
advantages ... also make it an attractive venue."S2  In London, the
preeminent organization dealing with matters of international maritime
arbitration is the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA).
Despite the perceived benefits of New York arbitration, as well as the
traditional and continued popularity of the city as one of the primary centers
for maritime arbitration in the world, there has actually been a notable shift
32, at 7 (stating that "the majority of shipping-related arbitrations in the United States are decided by
members of the SMA under the auspices of the SMA Rules").
47. See Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc., Guide to Maritime Arbitration in New York,
http://www.smany.org/sma/about2.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) ("New York has regularly been
chosen as an arbitral site in charter parties and other contracts of affireightment starting with the New
York Produce Exchange Time Charter in 1913."). See also Amicus Curiae Br. of Society of
Maritime Arbitrators, supra note 27, at 7 (stating that "New York City has, since the early parts of
the past century, been a central venue for maritime arbitrations and it is still one of the major centers
for dispute resolution of maritime contracts").
48. See generally Thomas H. Belknap, Jr., Notes from the Editor: New York vs. London
Arbitration, MAINBRACE (Blank Rome LLP, Washington D.C.), July 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/Publications/0014047F5DE71 E841 ECA2A40D736E8B7.pdf
("[T]he practice commonly used in London of having barristers represent parties before the
arbitrators introduces a double layer of cost (at very high hourly billing rates) that simply does not
exist in New York."). The article went on to explain that New York maritime arbitration is also
cheaper because "awards issued by New York arbitrators are governed by the New York
Convention," which means that "they are easily and quickly enforceable in most jurisdictions around
the world." Id. at I1.
49. Id. at 11 ("[T]he SMA ordinarily publishes its awards."). The article went on to state that
such transparency through publication of awards "engenders consistency" and "accountability." Id.
50. Id. ("If the parties require emergency relief or prompt resolution of an ongoing dispute,
New York arbitrators are well equipped to handle these kinds of emergencies.").
51. Harris Speech, supra note 46.
52. Jamie Maples, When Looking for a Seat ofArbitration, Try London!, THE METROPOLITAN
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away from New York in favor of London in recent years." According to
Bruce Harris, "New York's maritime arbitration practice has dwindled very
substantially, such that there is now no real question that London has at least
half and probably three-quarters-or more-of all the maritime arbitration
that takes place in the world."54
Aside from the significant benefits of arbitration in settling maritime
disputes, some commentators argue that arbitration, in general, has actually
been losing its appeal, becoming more "costly and prolonged."" Regardless
of such criticism, however, arbitration continues to be the preferred method
of dispute resolution in maritime commerce.
IV. CLASS ARBITRATION AND THE ADMIRALTY
A. Brief Introduction to the Class Action
Although arbitration is a subject too often neglected in law school
curricula, everyone who has been through law school has taken first-year
civil procedure and has heard of something called the class action. "The
class action is a ... procedural device that allows a small number of
individual plaintiffs to represent a larger group of plaintiffs in one [legal]
proceeding against a single defendant who caused a similar injury to all of
the plaintiffs."57 The concept of the class action is one that is relatively
exclusive to the legal system of the United States and is essentially an
American creation.'
Other common law countries have been slow to adopt the class action,
and the concept is "still relatively rare and unknown in civil law
53. See Harris Speech, supra note 46 (stating that such a shift has occurred "[i]n the past [ten]
years or so . . . "). See also London Maritime Arbitrators Association, About Us,
http://www.1maa.org.uk/about-us-Introduction.aspx ("[M]ore maritime disputes are referred to
arbitration in London than to any other place where arbitration services are offered."); Belknap,
supra note 48, at 2 ("[T]he New York [international shipping] arbitration market has not exactly kept
pace with London these last several years.").
54. See Harris Speech, supra note 46.
55. See Measter & Skoufalos, supra note 19, at 520. See also Zekos, supra note 39, at 542
(stating that "[i]t is argued that arbitration is no faster than litigation . . . ").
56. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 19, at 72 ("Despite any changes, maritime arbitration
remains a popular way to resolve maritime disputes . I . .").
57. Michael P. Daly, Come One, Come All: The New and Developing World ofNonsignatory
Arbitration and Class Arbitration, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95, 105 (2007). See generally FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(a).
58. See Daly, supra note 57, at 105 (stating that "the class action is a 'uniquely American
procedural device' .... "
430
10
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol11/iss3/9
[Vol. 11: 421, 2011]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
countries."" As a general rule, people fear what they do not understand, and
the class action is no exception. Indeed, there has been a widespread
wariness and distrust of the concept among foreign nations.60
B. Class Actions in Arbitration
In recent years, the concept of the class action has seeped into the world
of alternative dispute resolution, creating the unique animal6' before the
Court in Stolt-Nielsen-the class arbitration. Class arbitration may most
easily be described as "the coupling of the class action device with an
arbitral proceeding to form a hybrid 'class-wide arbitration."' 62 Although it
has much in common with its counterpart in litigation, class arbitration has a
much younger63 and less certainM history than the class action, and has "not
been universally or clearly accepted into U.S. jurisprudence."65 Indeed, the
issue of class arbitration remains much-debated and is largely up in the air.
Many have criticized the current state of limbo regarding class arbitrations,
with one critic stating that "[rlecent developments in class arbitration law
have left 'defendants with the worst of all worlds-the threat of a class
action in a forum without the procedural, evidentiary and appellate
protections available through the judicial process."'66
59. BERNARD HANATIOU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-
ISSUE AND CLASS AcTIONS 257-58 (2005).
60. See Daly, supra note 57, at 109 (stating that "[t]he U.S. class-action procedural device is
viewed with 'admiration and suspicion' abroad").
61. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (stating
that class arbitration is a "different animal [from] individual arbitration").
62. Greg Kilby, Leaving a Stone Unturned-The Unanswered Question from Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: Does the Federal Arbitration Act Permit Classwide Arbitration?, 59 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 413,420 (2005).
63. See Daly, supra note 57, at 107 ("[C]lass arbitrations have existed as a procedural device
in the United States since the 1980s . . . .").
64. See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications ofArbitral
Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1722 (2006) ("[T]he question of whether
nonparticipatory class members' rights may be foreclosed in a private class arbitration is not entirely
clear.").
65. Daly, supra note 57, at 107. See also Strong, supra note 33, at 1092 ("[C]lass arbitration
has developed primarily as a domestic phenomenon, insulated by the policy values and legal
principles of the different States in which it has appeared. Only recently have class disputes moved
to the international sphere.").
66. P. Christine Deruelle & Robert Clayton Roesch, Gaming The Rigged Class Arbitration
Game: How We Got Here And Where We Go Now-Part 1, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE
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One of the last major decisions to address class arbitration was Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.o In Bazzle, the issue presented to the Court
was whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits the imposition of class
arbitration when the parties' agreement is silent regarding class arbitration.
Some felt that the Court, however, failed to adequately address the issue,
sidestepping the problem instead by deciding that arbitrators, and not courts,
should determine whether class arbitration is permissible under the terms of
the contract.69 In the wake of Bazzle, however, there remained a split among
circuits on the issue of class arbitration, and many felt that the Court did not
adequately address the issue presented to it regarding class arbitration.
Indeed, the petitioners in Stolt-Nielsen urged the Court to examine and
resolve the basic issues underlying the issue presented but not answered in
Bazzle.n
C. Maritime Class Arbitration
Despite the decades-long existence of class arbitration and its use in
other sectors of the United States arbitration industry, experts have argued
that class arbitration is largely alien to maritime dispute resolution.72
Although AnimalFeeds maintained that mere testimony of the industry's
leading experts does not establish an industry custom which opposes class
arbitration," such testimony nevertheless sheds light on the fact that class
arbitrations have practically never been instituted in the maritime arbitration
industry, and that "there is no tradition of class arbitration under maritime
law."74
COUNSEL, Aug. 1, 2007, at 9, available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/August/09.pdf.
67. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
6 8. Id.
69. Id. at 451.
70. See Weston, supra note 64, at 1718 ("Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle raised
but failed to adequately address [several] concerns about class actions and arbitration.").
71. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 (2010).
72. See Harris Expert, supra note 19, 1 24 ("I have been working as a maritime arbitrator for
thirty years and this matter is the first I have ever encountered where the issue of a class action
arbitration has ever been raised."). See also Expert Declaration of John Kimball at 121.
73. See Resp't's Merits Br. at 42, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 3404244, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/preview/publiced_preview-briefspdfs09
10_08_1198_Respondentnew.authcheckdam.pdf.
74. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
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V. SYNTHESIS AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Various vigorous arguments have been made by the parties in Stolt-
Nielsen, as well as by other commentators, as to the applicability of class
arbitration in the maritime industry. At the outset, the Society of Maritime
Arbitrators claimed that the use of class arbitration in maritime disputes
would be contrary to the aforementioned aims and benefits of arbitration in
maritime commerce, which have made arbitration so popular and reliable
among maritime shippers." According to Bruce Harris, these established
benefits "would be wholly undermined if one party could impose on another
a U.S. style class action litigation."76 Moreover, another expert claimed that
"many of [the] traditional advantages may be lost in class, as opposed to
individual, arbitration proceedings."
In their reply brief, Petitioners argued that class arbitrations would be at
odds with bilaterality, one of the key benefits of maritime arbitration.
Class actions, by their very nature, require numerous parties.79 Petitioners
further argued that "[s]uch substantially raised stakes make class
proceedings different in kind from bilateral disputes, where each party's
exposure is naturally circumscribed."80 The lack of a bilateral resolution
resulting from the introduction of numerous parties would hinder, or perhaps
even defeat, another cornerstone benefit of traditional maritime arbitration-
speedy resolution.
75. See Amicus Curiae Br. of Society of Maritime Arbitrators, supra note 27, at 8 (stating that,
by the arbitrators allowing class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen, "the result was contrary to what has
commonly been understood to be the position in the industry"). The SMA went on to argue that
"because of the truly international application of maritime contracts, and because arbitration is the
preferred means of dispute resolution, it is of the utmost importance that the parties feel comfortable
with the process." Id.
76. Harris Expert, supra note 19, 1 21.
77. Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 66, at 9. See also Amicus Curiae Br. of Society of
Maritime Arbitrators, supra note 27, at 4 (stating that there is a "total absence of a tradition for class
arbitration in maritime disputes" and that the SMA "generally sees no place for class arbitration in
maritime disputes").
78. See Pet'r's Reply Br., at 17-18, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 4030381, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/preview/publiced_preview-briefs_pdfs09
10_08 1198 PetitionerReply.authcheckdam.pdf.
79. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (stating that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all class
members is impracticable").
80. See Pet'r's Reply Br., supra note 78, at 18.
81. See Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 66, at 9 ("(Elach of the interim phases related to
class-and merits-arbitral awards will carry with them potential burdens relating to discovery,
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Respondents, on the other hand, argued that "[t]o the contrary, class
arbitration captures efficiencies that often make the difference between fair
recovery and none."82 Although class arbitrations are efficient at
consolidating the claims of many against one, the Pacific Legal Foundation
claimed that this is exactly the type of efficiency that maritime arbitration, at
least historically, has sought to avoid. The Association of Ship Brokers
and Agents argued, and rightfully so, that "[d]ue to the nature of class
actions, there would be a multitude of parties, lawyers and expert witnesses,
the very antithesis of the bilateral informality of maritime arbitrations.""
Opponents argue that if a class procedure would be permitted, the
maritime arbitration would not be private,85 while other commentators
maintain that such transparency would actually be beneficial. Moreover,
some critics believe that class arbitrations would pose a significant
impediment to the ability of the parties to select a specialized arbitrator, one
of the aforementioned key benefits of maritime arbitration. As one critic
explained, "[t]he parties may choose, for example, an arbitrator with a class
action background, instead of an arbitrator familiar with the substantive law
governing the dispute, in a class arbitration proceeding." And with
maritime arbitrations, selection of a specialized maritime arbitrator, as
opposed to an arbitrator with class action expertise or even a judge with
general legal knowledge, is paramount to the purposes of choosing to
arbitrate maritime disputes in the first place."
briefing, hearings, and time, money and effort spent in obtaining judicial review at each of the
various phases, which will not necessarily be present in individual arbitrations.").
82. See Resp't's Merits Br., supra note 73, at 46.
83. See generally Amicus Curiae Br. of the Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners
at 7, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL
2875370, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced preview briefspdfs -07
08 08 1198_PetitionerAmCuPLF.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Br. of the Pacific
Legal Foundation] (stating that "considerations of economic efficiency do not warrant imposing
arbitration on parties against their will").
84. See Amicus Curiae Br. of Ship Brokers And Agents, supra note 32, at 31-32.
85. See Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 66, at 9 ("[T]he specter of class arbitration disposes of
the presumption of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration.").
86. See Strong, supra note 33, at 1087 ("[Transparency] is particularly important for class
arbitration, since public interest exists in both the outcome and the process itself.").
87. Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 66, at 9.
88. Id
89. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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VI. THE STOLT-NIELSEN DECISION, ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT,
AND THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ARBITRATION
A. The Stolt-Nielsen Decision
Some predicted Stolt-Nielsen to be closely decided, dividing the court
and creating two main coalitions-those Justices who would oppose a
finding of class arbitration in the absence of contractual silence, and those
Justices who would find otherwise.90 In light of what took place at the oral
arguments on December 9, 2009, however, other commentators believed that
AnimalFeeds had the majority of the Court in its corner.9' The stances of
some of the Justices became apparent from their questioning, but others,
such as Justice Scalia, made their position ambiguous.92
On April 27, 2010, however, any doubt was dismissed when the
Supreme Court released its long-awaited decision in Stolt-Nielsen." In
delivering the majority opinion, Justice Alito found for Stolt-Nielsen and
against AnimalFeeds,94 broadly holding that imposing class arbitration on
parties that have not agreed to authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with
the FAA and the foundational principle that arbitration is a matter of
consent, not coercion.95
90. See Stolt-Nielsen Oral Argument Analysis: Part I, http://loreelawfirm.com/blog/stolt-
nielsen-oral-argument-analysis-part-i (Dec. 13, 2009, 08:39 EST) ("[C]ertain members of the Court
appear to have joined one of two coalitions."). The article went on to explain that "[olne [coalition]
consists of Justices John Paul Stevens, Stephen G. Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg," and the "other
apparent coalition consists of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice
Samuel A. Alito, Jr . . . ." Id. Later, in Part V of his analysis, Loree explains that "[tihe Breyer
Coalition appears to be leaning toward either taking a pass or affirming the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld the arbitrators' award imposing class
arbitration . . . ." Stolt-Nielsen Oral Argument Analysis: Part V, http://loreelawfirm.com/blog/stolt-
nielsen-oral-argument-analysis-part-v-should-class-or-consolidated-arbitration-be-imposed-if-the-
contract-is-silent (Feb. 16, 2010, 19:59 EST). Loree further explained that "the Roberts Coalition
appears to be leaning toward reversal." Id.
91. See Posting of Vivian Wang to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/?p= 13795
(Dec. 11, 2009, 13:20 EST) (stating that "[i]f the Justices' questions are taken at face value,
respondents have likely garnered the votes of a majority of the Court").
92. Id.
93. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
94. Id. Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and
Scalia. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
95. Id. at 1768.
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The Court went on to state that allowing otherwise would be contrary to
established precedent, policy,96 and reaffirmed the truism that "there is no
tradition of class arbitration under maritime law." 7 The Court remarked that
"class arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it
cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit
their disputes to an arbitrator," 98 which clearly reaffirmed the stated
positions of opponents of class arbitration in maritime dispute resolution."
Furthermore, the Court expounded the advantages of arbitration,'
similar to those set forth above,o' and commented on the "fundamental
changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action
arbitration."' 0  The Court emphasized that class arbitration changes the
underlying, bargained-for benefits of bilateral dispute resolution, 03 and that
the privacy and confidentiality that make bilateral arbitration so enticing in
the first place are lost when one moves to a class-wide arbitral process."
The Court noted, however, that its decision did not follow from its
recent decision in Bazzle. 05  The Court remarked that the parties
misunderstood Bazzle and that Bazzle "did not control resolution of the
question" in the instant case. 06  Moreover, Justice Ginsburg, joined by
96. Id. at 1774 ("[It is also clear from our precedents and the contractual nature of arbitration
that parties may specify with whom they choose to arbitrate their disputes.").
97. Id. at 1775.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
100. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 ("In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor
and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower
costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes."). "By agreeing to arbitrate .. . [a party] trades the procedures and opportunity
for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Id. at
1774 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
"Parties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the economics of dispute resolution." Id. at
1775 (quoting 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1464 (2009) (citing Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001))).
101. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
102. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775-76 ("But the relative benefits of class-action arbitration
are much less assured, giving reason to doubt the parties' mutual consent to resolve disputes through
class-wide arbitration.").
103. Id. at 1776 ("An arbitrator chosen according to an agreed-upon procedure ... no longer
resolves a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement, but instead resolves many
disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties."). "The arbitrator's award no
longer purports to bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of
absent parties as well." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1772.
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Justices Stevens and Breyer, briefly expressed their belief that AnimalFeeds,
not Stolt-Nielsen, should have prevailed."o7
B. Impact and Quick Thoughts
Freedom to contract, one of the most basic and long-established
principles of contract interpretation, dictates that parties that expressly and
knowingly agree to arbitration on a class level are free to do so and should
be bound to such an agreement.o Although a maritime party, at least in the
United States, most certainly can enter into a contract providing for class
arbitration,'09 it is readily apparent that by doing so, he would be defeating
the very purposes and benefits of arbitrating maritime disputes in the first
place. But this is not the type of party with whom the Court in Stolt-Nielsen
was concerned.
The problem dealt with in Stolt-Nielsen, and in many contracts in
general, is when agreements are silent on a disputed issue. If class
arbitration was imposed on all arbitration clauses that are silent on the issue
of class arbitration, maritime entities entering into contracts whose terms call
for arbitration would be much more careful in crafting and entering into
contracts with such clauses. Furthermore, with much of the maritime
arbitration industry being opposed to the concept, if silence in the contract
implied acceptance of class arbitration, it is possible that many maritime
parties entering into such contracts would require explicit waiver of any
class arbitration.
Moreover, although Stolt-Nielsen involves a dispute between parties
engaged in maritime commerce,"o the decision in the case is clearly not
limited to maritime entities. The arguments made in this article, although of
clearly emphasized importance and specificity in the maritime context, are
of equal applicability and significance to the general arbitration community.
107. Id. at 1777-83.
108. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and The "Rise and Fall", 79 B.U. L.
REV. 263, 282-83 (1999).
109. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) ("[P]arties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.").
110. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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C. BriefSpeculation and the Future of Maritime Arbitration
1. Brief Speculation
Some industries have rejected the usage of class arbitration,"' and the
Association of Ship Brokers and Agents argued that class arbitrations are
"wholly foreign to maritime practice," and that class arbitrations "have not
been and would not be accepted by the maritime arbitral community."ll 2
Considering the established and continuing usage of traditional, bilateral
arbitration in settling maritime disputes, it does not seem unrealistic to think
that the maritime industry would not embrace class arbitration. If Stolt-
Nielsen had held otherwise, United States maritime arbitration may have
taken a particularly hard hit.
As previously discussed, New York and London are the two principal
locations where maritime arbitration occurs.'13 Some believe, and logically
so, that "imposing class actions in an international maritime arbitration ...
would deter parties from selecting the United States as the dispute resolution
situs."I14 Parties would be likely to choose to arbitrate in a foreign locale,
such as London, whose judicial and arbitral systems do not tpically
recognize class actions, much less class arbitrations in such settings.'
Given that there has already been a notable shift away from New York
in favor of London in recent years as a preferred situs for maritime
arbitration,' 16 an adverse decision in Stolt-Nielsen could have brought this
already significant trend full circle, and could very well have been a catalyst
for the continued decline in popularity of selecting the United States as a
forum for international maritime arbitration." 7
111. See Kilby, supra note 62, at 422-23 ("[T~he entire securities industry has rejected
classwide arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.").
112. See Amicus Curiae Br. of Ship Brokers And Agents, supra note 32, at 32. See also Stolt-
Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010)("[T]here is no tradition of class
arbitration under maritime law.. . .").
113. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
114. Pet'r's Reply Br., supra note 78, at 42. See also Harris Expert, supra note 19, 20 ("[I]f
reasonable charterers and owners were told that arbitration in New York meant exposure to class
actions, they would almost always prefer another arbitral situs."); Kimball Expert, supra note 72, 1
16.
115. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
117. See Catherine Sub & Andrew Kaplan, Stolt-Nielsen SA. v. AnimalFeeds International,
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTTUTE, http://topics.law.comell.edulsupct/cert/08-l198 ("The Supreme
Court's decision will place an economic burden on the losing side and may affect international
businesses decisions on whether to select a forum in the United States."). See also Amicus Curiae
Br. of Ship Brokers And Agents, supra note 32, at II (stating that "there would be less fixing of
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Critics, however, argue that such broad and sweeping negative
implications were over-exaggerated."18 They argue that such criticisms and
predictions of the impact of Stolt-Nielsen were merely general complaints
about the concept of aggregate litigation in general, and were merely policy
reasons for not accepting a new concept that many proponents believe to be
more beneficial than harmful." 9 Regardless of whether these complaints
were "merely general," as proponents maintain, they are still valid and
widely-recognized, and even more so in the context of maritime arbitration.
Many feared that, had the Court held otherwise, the arbitration Lord
Donaldson spoke of, regarded by the shippers and commodity traders of the
world as a "normal incident of commercial life," would become completely
the opposite, and may very well have led such maritime entities to regard
arbitration, at least American-based international maritime arbitration, with
great abhorrence.120 However, it appears, for the time being at least, that the
words of the great Lord Donaldson of Lymington stand true, as Stolt-Nielsen
represents a crucial step forward in protecting the tradition and sanctity of
bilateral United States maritime arbitration that this article and many others
have argued so vigorously for. Regardless of such a ruling, however, the
fact remains that class arbitration is a procedural and arbitral device in its
infant stages, and it is more than certain that its maturity will stir much
debate, both legally and scholarly, for some time to come.
charters in the United States as foreign companies would look elsewhere for their shipping
contracts").
118. See generally Resp't's Merits Br., supra note 73, at 43.
119. See generally id.
120. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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